Abstract. Stream cipher initialisation should ensure that the initial state or keystream is not detectably related to the key and initialisation vector. In this paper we analyse the key/IV setup of the eSTREAM Phase 2 candidates Salsa20 and TSC-4. In the case of Salsa20 we demonstrate a key recovery attack on six rounds and observe non-randomness after seven. For TSC-4, non-randomness over the full eight-round initialisation phase is detected, but would also persist for more rounds.
Introduction
Many synchronous stream ciphers use two inputs for keystream generation; a secret key K and a non-secret initialisation vector IV . The IV allows different keystreams to be derived from a single secret key and facilitates resynchronization. In the general model of a synchronous stream cipher there are three functions. During initialisation a function F maps the input pair (K, IV ) to a secret initial state X. The state of the cipher then evolves at time t under the action of a function f that updates the state X according to X t+1 = f(X t ). Keystream is generated using an output function g to give a block of keystream z t = g(X t ). While TSC-4 follows this model, Salsa20 has no state update function f and g involves reading out the state X. Instead, we view the IV to Salsa20 as being the combination of a 64-bit nonce and a 64-bit counter and keystream is generated by repeatedly computing F(K, IV ) for an incremented counter.
In the analysis of keystream generators (i.e. in the analysis of f and g) it is typical to assume that the initial state X is random. Hence for a stream cipher we require that F has suitable randomness properties, and in particular, that it has good diffusion with regards to both IV and K. (Clearly this applies equally to the case when the output of F is the keystream.) Indeed, if diffusion of the IV is not complete then there may well be statistical or algebraic dependences in the keystreams for different IV's, as chosen-IV attacks on numerous stream ciphers demonstrate (e.g., [6, 9, 8] ). Good mixing of the secret key is similarly required and there should not be any identifiable subsets of keys that have a traceable influence on the initial state (or on the generated keystream), see [7] . Since, in many cases, F is constructed from the repeated application of a relatively simple function over r rounds, determining the required number of rounds r can be difficult. For a well-designed scheme, we would expect the security of the mechanism to increase with r, though there is a clear cost in reduced efficiency.
In this paper we investigate the initialisation of Salsa20 and TSC-4. We consider a set of well-chosen inputs (K, IV ) and compute the outputs F(K, IV ). Under an appropriate measure we aim to detect non-random behaviour in the output. Throughout we assume that the IV's can be chosen and that most, or all, of the key bits are unknown. The paper is organized as follows. The specification of Salsa20 is recalled in Section 2 with an analysis up to seven rounds in Section 3. TSC-4 is described in Section 4 with analysis in Section 5. We draw our conclusions in Section 6. For notation we use + for addition modulo 2 32 , ⊕ for bitwise XOR, ∧ for bitwise AND, ≪ for bitwise left-rotation, and ≪ for bitwise left-shift. The most (least) significant bit will be denoted msb (lsb).
Description of Salsa20
A full description of Salsa20 can be found in [1] . As mentioned in the introduction, we view the initialisation vector as IV = (v 0 , v 1 , i 0 , i 1 ) where (v 0 , v 1 ) denotes the nonce and (i 0 , i 1 ) the counter. Throughout we consider the 256-bit key version of Salsa20 and we denote the key by K = (k 0 , . . . , k 7 ) and four constants by c 0 , . . ., c 3 (see [1] ). We denote the cipher state by X = (x 0 , . . . , x 15 ) where each x i is a 32-bit word.
At each application of the initialisation process F(K, IV ) 512 bits of keystream are generated by using the entirety of the final state as the keystream. The computation F is built around the quarterround function illustrated in Fig. 1 with the notation quarterround(y 0 , y 1 , y 2 ,
? - Fig. 1 . The quarterround function of Salsa20.
The operation columnround function updates all 16 words of the state X and can be described as follows. Each column i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, is rotated upwards by i array positions. Each column is then used independently as input to the quarterround function. The resulting set of four columns, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, are then rotated down by i array positions.
The operation rowround can be viewed as being identical to the columnround operation except that the state array is transposed both before and after using the columnround operation. Salsa20 updates the internal state by using columnround and rowround one after the other. After r rounds, the state is denoted X r and the keystream given by z = X 0 + X r using wordwise addition modulo 2 32 . The original version of Salsa20 has r = 20, i.e. 10 rounds of columnround interleaved with 10 rounds of rowround, though shorter versions with r = 8 and r = 12 have been proposed [2] .
Analysis of Salsa20
In this section we will demonstrate two related instances of non-random behaviour. These are detectable over six and seven rounds of Salsa20 respectively. Depending on the attack model this also permits key recovery. To start, we illustrate our approach by building on the earlier work of Crowley [5] and we describe a framework that allows a more sophisticated analysis to take place. This is achieved in two steps. First, we identify interesting differential effects in a simplified version of Salsa20. Second, we identify key and IV choices that allow us to ensure that the behaviour of the genuine Salsa20 is reasonably well-approximated by the simplified version. This technique allows us to make a systematic research of possible input differences ID's and consequently to find ID's with optimal properties.
As mentioned, our observations are differential in nature. We will work with two copies of the state where X 0 is filled with the input (K, IV ) and a second state Y 
A Linearised Version of Salsa20
In previous work, Crowley [5] identified a truncated differential over three rounds of Salsa20. Consider setting ∆ 0 i = 0 for i = 9 and ∆ 0 9 = 0x80000000. Then the following truncated differential for the first three rounds holds with a theoretical probability 2 −12 . In practice a variety of effects conspire to give an average probability of 2 −9 . 3 it is tempting to look for some impact in the next round. Yet, it is not clear how to proceed in a methodical manner. To establish an appropriate framework for analysis, we introduce an alternative algorithm LinSalsa20. This is identical to Salsa20 except that all integer additions have been replaced by exclusive-or. The corresponding round functions are denoted LinColumnround and LinRowround. Assume that two initial states X 0 and Y 0 = X 0 ⊕ ∆ 0 are iterated by LinSalsa20. Then since LinSalsa20 is completely linear in GF(2), the difference ∆ r = X r ⊕ Y r coincides exactly with computing r iterations of ∆ 0 with LinSalsa20. This computation does not require knowledge of the key and we refer to a differential path generated by LinSalsa20 as a linear differential. It is straightforward to see that there are many (admissible) input differences for which the output of LinSalsa20 is trivially non-random. Proposition 1. Consider an input ∆ 0 i ∈ {0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000} for all words i = 0, . . ., 15. Then, for any number of updates with LinSalsa20, one has ∆ r i ∈ {0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000}.
However we need to be more careful. While LinSalsa20 allows some straightforward analysis, the further the behaviour of LinSalsa20 is from the true Salsa20, the less useful it will be. Since a differential of large Hamming weight is likely to induce carries and hence non-linear behaviour to the genuine Salsa20, we will need a linear differential of low Hamming weight. Such a differential is intended to offer a reasonably good approximation to the same differential in genuine Salsa20. We will consider a linear differential to be of low weight if any computation involving active words in the difference only uses words of low Hamming weight (≪ 16). Let us consider Crowley's differential within this linear model. The top line of this differential is as far as Crowley goes, but when using LinSalsa20 it appears we can go one round further. Indeed, one can identify a low-weight linear differential for word x 4 12 , among others. Note that x 12 is a right-to-diagonal word (with wrap) and is updated first in round four; the 16 in x 3 13 has no effect on x 4 12 . ⊓ ⊔ The linear model can also be used to find longer differentials. A well-chosen multibit input may cause smaller diffusion than a single-bit input; non-zero bits can be placed in positions where they are annihilated in the update process. To illustrate, we focus again on a single column where the weight of the input (starting with the diagonal element) is (0, 2, 1, 1). With a fixed relative position of the non-zero bits in this input, one can obtain an output after the first round of the form (0, 1, 0, 0). The absolute position of the non-zero bits and the choice of column are free parameters and naturally leads to an identified sub-class of inputs. These all have the same properties in LinSalsa20. which is an out-ofdiagonal word. Note that some words in the final array may have a lower Hamming weight, but their generation required computations using average-weighted words and so they are unlikely to be relevant to genuine Salsa20. ⊓ ⊔
Differentials in True Salsa20
In Section 3.1 we identified classes of inputs (with a required ID) which gave lowweight truncated linear differentials after four and five rounds of LinSalsa20. For genuine (nonlinear) Salsa20, the same differentials might not behave in the same way and a differential trail will depend on the input. Therefore to find optimal ID's and inputs we will need to consider which conditions allow the non-linear differential trail to be closely approximated by the linear differential. The only non-linear operation in Salsa20 is integer addition in the quarterround function, denoted x a + x b . Given an ID (∆ a , ∆ b ), the nonlinear OD corresponds to the XOR of x a +x b and (x a ⊕∆ a )+(x b ⊕∆ b ). Thus, the nonlinear OD is identical to the linear OD, if
Each non-zero bit in ∆ a and ∆ b may cause integer addition to create or annihilate a sequence of carry bits. Hence we focus on low-weight trails to keep more control of such events. Note that a difference in the most significant bit is always linear. In the following sections, we will be indirectly considering Eq. 1 when placing conditions on the inputs so that a differential in Salsa20 follows a linear differential in LinSalsa20 for some steps before diverging. Such conditions might be on the nonce, on the counter (conditions which can be satisfied by sampling a keystream in the appropriate way), or on the key (thereby establishing classes of weak keys). While many of these issues are complex, for instance, conditions aimed at linearising the ID must not conflict with the way the counter is likely to be incremented, some results are given in the subsequent sections.
Non-randomness in Four and Five Rounds of Salsa20
Consider the linear differential of Ex. 1 and set ID to be identical to that of [5] . By using LinSalsa20 we suspect a statistical imbalance in x . Given a set of N different pairs of (K, IV ), where each pair takes the same fixed ID, the distribution of the output difference for the N pairs can be analysed. However, we might consider a subset of the bits or even a single bit, and by examining each bit in x 4 12 ⊕ y 4 12 one finds that bit 26 is heavily unbalanced 4 . This imbalance can be detected using a χ 2 test (see Appendix A) where a χ 2 score greater than some threshold is good evidence of non-randomness.
The behaviour of the differential is heavily key-dependent. The presence or absence of carries, on which Salsa20 relies, depends on the actual values of the operands. Thus some keys will dampen, and others amplify, the evolution of a differential. The imbalance in bit 26 is greater the closer Salsa20 is to LinSalsa20. A close inspection of the first round of the differential reveals that the first two additions, differentially speaking, act as XOR while the third does not. However, depending on how i 1 is incremented, we can establish conditions on the key to ensure that it does. Thus there are keys for which the imbalance in bit 26 is boosted. We refer to this as partially linearising the first round of the differential 5 and key conditions that achieve this are presented in Appendix B. . In a χ 2 test on a single bit with threshold T = 40, the probability a uniform random source gives χ 2 > 40 is around 2 −32 , thus the probability of false alarm is 2 −32 . For 100 experiments using random keys and nonces, the results are listed in Tab. 1.
⊓ ⊔ 
4 In fact there are many unbalanced bits in the state of Salsa20 after four rounds. 5 A more sophisticated set of conditions can be derived to linearise the entirety of the first round. However for clarity we restrict ourselves to the simpler case.
Notice that ∆ 2 , then no carry is produced from the right, and Eq. 1 is satisfied. Subsequently x 2 is updated and so provided the previous update followed the linear differential, the only non-zero bit in the difference will be in bit 31 and the linear trial will be followed. Updating x 6 is similar while updating x 11 only involves zero differences. Thus we have identified conditions on three bits of v 0 , part of the nonce, so that the first round of genuine Salsa20 with the ID of Ex. 2 follows the linear trail. In fact, the ID of Ex. 2 turns out to be optimal, i.e. it seems to have minimum weight after two rounds of Salsa20; bitwise rotations of ID reduce the number of msb's while shifting the difference to another column shifts the input-condition to a key word instead of v 0 . Without input conditions on v 0 , the first round would follow the linear trail with a probability of about Pr = 0.175. . In a χ 2 test on a single bit with threshold T = 40, the probability a uniform random source gives χ 2 > 40 is around 2 −32 . For 100 experiments using random keys and nonces, the results are listed in Tab. 2.
Non-randomness in Six and Seven Rounds of Salsa20
The results presented in Section 3.3 give statistical weaknesses, as measured by the χ 2 test on a single bit, over four rounds and five rounds of Salsa20. To create these biased distributions, we used ID's of slightly different types. For the four round imbalance we use a non-zero difference in the counter values while for the five round imbalance we use non-zero differences in part of the key k 1 and k 7 . We will comment on this later since it has an impact on the attacks we can mount. Both statistical anomalies can be detected two rounds later. In both cases we intercept the required keystream and we guess the necessary key words to unwind the last two rounds of state update. Thus, for a single guess of the relevant words of key, the backwards computation is carried out over two rounds for N pairs of output, where each output was generated using the chosen input difference. The χ 2 statistic of the target bit of the target word is evaluated, and a χ 2 test with some threshold T applied. Our analysis tells us that a correct key guess will yield a significant χ 2 score. We assume that an incorrect key guess results in essentially random candidate values for the bit we test. Thus, a significantly large χ 2 value suggests that the key guess may be correct. The remaining key words can be searched exhaustively and the entire key guess verified against the keystream. If the χ 2 value for a key guess is not significant we move on to a new guess. The target word and bit as well as the key words to guess are given in Tab. 3. 1 Salsa20/7 k0 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6
Clearly, the scale of the imbalance in the target bit is important to the success of this method. The closer Salsa20 behaves to LinSalsa20 then the greater the imbalance in the target bit, and the greater the χ 2 score we expect to observe. This helps an attacker in two ways:
1. If certain keys and IV's give a high χ 2 score, then a greater proportion of the keys from an identified set should be susceptible to attack. 2. Higher χ 2 scores permit less keystream or greater precision in an attack.
To begin to get a picture of how things might behave in practice, we have implemented a restricted version of this style of attack. In principle we could use the four round differential of Ex. 3 to attack six rounds of Salsa20. To keep the experiments tractable, however, we use the same differential to attack a restricted five-round version as a demonstration (i.e. we unwind one round only).
Example 5. We recover nine bits (bits 4 to 12) of k 3 under the assumption that k 5 has been correctly guessed. Over 100 random keys and nonces and N pairs, we give the success rate when assuming the correct key lies among the candidate values giving the three highest χ 2 values. We repeat the experiment for the weak key class identified in Ex. 3. For the weak key class we observe that the same proportion of keys can be recovered when using one quarter of the text, see Tab. 4 . We recall that the weak keys only improve the differential propagation and that our attack is also working for other keys.
⊓ ⊔
As demonstrated in Ex. 5, at least in principle, our observations can be used in the way we intend. In the case of Salsa20/6 we estimate the work effort for a key-recovery attack to be around 2 177 operations using 2 16 pairs of keystream blocks sampled appropriately from the same keystream 6 . This is a crude estimate. Since such an attack requires guessing more key bits, more text may well be required. However, since the entirety of the target word can be recovered for any single key guess, using a single bit to test a key will miss much of the information available. Thus, it seems prudent to anticipate a final complexity close to these initial estimates. Under a related-key attack Salsa20/7 might be broken in around 2 217 operations using 2 24 pairs of keystream blocks taken from two sets of keystream. However, the practical validity of such an attack is debatable [3] , so we merely observe that over seven of the 20 rounds in Salsa20, statistical imbalances can be detected.
Description of TSC-4
The stream cipher TSC-4 is specified in [12] . It consists of two states X and Y of 4 × 32 bits each, denoted
We first describe the regular update function f, which updates the two states X and Y independently by single-cycle T-functions. In the case of state X, a 32-bit parameter α X is computed as a function of X. It is defined by The output function g produces a keystream byte z by combining some bytes of both states (using integer addition, XOR, shift and rotation), see [12] for more details. Consider the initialisation function F of TSC-4. To start, the internal state of 256 bits is loaded with K = (k 0 , . . . , k 9 ) and IV = (i 0 , . . . , i 9 ) each of 10 × 8 bits (a single 32-bit word is denoted as a concatenation of four 8-bit words).
A single round of the initialisation function (denoted as a warm-up update) consists of a regular update and some additional operations: A byte z = g(X) is produced, x 1 and y 0 are rotated to the left by eight positions, and then byte z is XOR-ed to the 8 least significant bits of x 1 and y 0 . The specifications of TSC-4 propose r = 8 rounds.
Analysis of TSC-4
In [10, 11] , predecessors of TSC-4 have been attacked by exploiting a bit-flip bias for multiple applications of the state update function f. This bias still exists for regular updates of TSC-4, but the strong filter function g prevents from an attack. In this section, we disregard the details of the filter function and investigate the statistical properties of multiple warm-up updates of TSC-4: While the regular updates have some guaranteed properties, the warm-up updates use additional ad hoc operations that are designed to accelerate diffusion. Notice that our analysis is embedded in a more general context: we actually consider the initialisation function F of TSC-4 and try to detect some non-random behaviour in a set of outputs (i.e. in the TSC-4 initial states) that are produced by a set of well-chosen inputs (i.e. in the IV's).
Statistical Model of Initialisation
We investigate the statistical properties of the initialisation process. In our simple statistical model, we assume that α (with exception of the lsb) and the feedback z are uniformly randomly. Consider a single bit-slice i (not the least significant one) in the state X, then our assumptions imply for each round:
1. Bit-slice i is mapped uniformly randomly by S or by S 6 . 2. After application of the S-box, bit 1 of bit-slice i is chosen uniformly randomly.
With a fixed input w ∈ {0, . . . , 15}, these two steps are repeated for r rounds, so we can analyse the distribution of the output v ∈ {0, . . . , 15}. Within this model, the distribution can be computed exactly in 2 2r steps. The other cases (i.e. the leastsignificant bit-slice and the state Y ) are treated similarly. The bias of the distribution is measured with the Euclidean Squared Distance ε 2 := ε 2 v with ε v := Pr(v) − 1/16, where Pr(v) denotes the probability for output v (given some fixed parameters). In Tab. 5, the bias ε 2 is shown for different parameters. To simplify the presentation we compute ε 2 for all inputs w and show the average values only. 2.1 × 10
As expected, the average bias is decreasing with the number of rounds r. In the case of the least-significant bit-slice in the state X, it is reduced by a factor of about 2.6 with each additional round. Interestingly, the position of the random bit (step 2) has a notable influence on the distribution and diffusion is better for state Y . And, as expected, diffusion is better for bit-slices which are not on the least-significant position (intuitively a combination of S and S 6 results in larger diffusion than using S only).
Experimental Results
Now we attempt to detect the bias of the previous subsection in the genuine initialisation function F(K, IV ) of TSC-4. We need N different inputs (K, IV ) where the value of a fixed bit-slice i is the same for all inputs. Each bit-slice consists of two key bits and two IV bits. Consequently, bit-slice i is the same for all inputs, if the key is fixed (and unknown), and if the IV bits of bit-slice i are fixed (though the other IV bits can be varied). The N outputs can then be used to evaluate a χ 2 statistic on bit-slice i. Provided that the assumptions on the model of the previous section are valid, bit-slice i = 0 of the state X is expected to have maximum bias. Here is an example for r = 8 rounds. Example 6. Take N different inputs (K, IV ) where IV = (i 0 , . . . , i 9 ). The key is fixed, IV bytes i 0 , i 1 . . . , i 7 are zero, and i 8 , i 9 increments from 0 to N − 1. Compute all N outputs after r = 8 rounds of F(K, IV ) and evaluate the χ 2 statistic on the leastsignificant bit-slice in the state X of the output. In a χ 2 test on 4 bits with threshold T = 80, the probability a uniform random source gives χ 2 > 80 is around 2 −34 . For 100 experiments using random keys, the results are listed in Tab. 6 . ⊓ ⊔ For all three choices of N , the assigned bias ε 2 = (χ 2 − 15)/16N becomes about 2 −9.2 (see Appendix A). This is in good agreement with the model of Section 5.1, which predicts an average bias of ε 2 = 2 −9.8 in this setup 7 . Of course, the initial state cannot be accessed by an attacker, so the χ 2 test has perhaps a certificational character. However, the setup of Ex. 6 does not require any key bit to be known, and the number of samples N is very small. Consequently, this non-randomness may be a basis for future attacks that includes analysis of the filter function g. The nonrandomness is not limited to the least significant bit-slice. A notable example is i = 8 (and with other parameters as in Ex. 6), which results in an average value of χ 2 = 45 for N = 2 10 . This is a consequence of the specific setup in Ex. 6 where bit-slices i = 8, 9 . . . of X after the first round are the same for all N states and so the effective number of rounds is only r − 1 (in addition, the biased bit 1 of bit-slice 0 is rotated into bit-slice 8). The above experiment with i = 8 was carried out for a varying number of rounds, see Fig. 2 . In order to measure χ 2 values for a larger number of rounds, we increased the number of samples to N = 2
18 . This was done by choosing zero IV bytes i 0 , i 1 , . . ., i 5 and counting up i 6 , i 7 , i 8 , i 9 from 0 to N − 1. Supplementary experiments revealed that ε 2 is approximately constant for different values of N , hence ε 2 is a good measure for the diffusion of F. The bias ε 2 in terms of r can be approximated by an exponential decay and in one round ε 2 is reduced by a factor of about 2.5. By extrapolation, we expect that about r = 32 rounds would be necessary to obtain a bias of ε 2 = 2 −40 . In an extended experiment one could also measure the effectiveness of the combined initialisation function F and update function f t . For example, with r = 8, t = 50 and N = 2 18 , we observed an average value of χ 2 = 32 when using the same setup as previously. However we did not observe a bias in the keystream.
Conclusions
In this paper we considered the way the key and the initialisation information is used in two Phase 2 candidates in eSTREAM. In the case of TSC-4, the initial cipher state is derived using eight applications of a warm-up function. Non-randomness over all eight iterations can be detected in the initial state with about 1000 inputs. Each additional round increases the data requirements by a factor of about 2.5 and this non-randomness requires the attacker to choose IV bits only. However no bias in the keystream of TSC-4 resulting from this non-randomness has yet been detected, so it remains to be seen if our observations can form the basis for an attack in the future. As the rating of Focus candidate in eSTREAM Phase 2 testifies, Salsa20 is widely viewed as a very promising proposal. Nothing in this paper affects the security of the full version of the cipher. However we expect that the key can be recovered from five rounds of 128-bit Salsa20 with around 2 81 operations and six rounds of 256-bit Salsa20 with around 2 177 operations. Both attacks would require very moderate amounts of text. If we allow related-key attacks then the security of seven rounds of 256-bit Salsa20 might be in question with around 2 217 operations. However, given divided opinions on such an attack model, we prefer to observe that a statistical weakness has been observed over seven rounds. While we anticipate some progress, we are doubtful that many more rounds can be attacked using the methods of this paper. Thus Salsa20 still appears to be a conservative design. Given our results, however, we are doubtful that Salsa20/8 will offer adequate security in the future, though Salsa20/12 could turn out to be a well-balanced proposal.
